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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
indicate a strong desire on the part of the legislature that these
courts should not decide large disputes. This desire was expressly
recognized by at least one of our appellate courts in the previ-
ously mentioned case of Koerner v. Francingues.25 The effect of
the majority ruling in the instant case would be to expand the
jurisdiction of these courts by allowing them to hear cases where
the amount actually in dispute may greatly exceed their maxi-
mum jurisdictional limit. This could lead to crowding of city
court calendars and the defeat of their primary purpose. For the
reasons given above it is submitted that the dissenting opinion
in the principal case is the correct one and should be followed.
James R. Pettway
EXPROPRIATION-ACTIONS EX DELICTO FOR
UNLAWFUL APPROPRIATION
The Highway Department expropriated a temporary servi-
tude on defendant's land to obtain fill for an interstate highway.
After the vesting of title and withdrawal of the $37,000 deposit,
the Department filed an amended petition seeking to accom-
modate local industry by changing the location of the borrow
pit to another part of defendant's land. The condemnee timely
objected to the procedure and the condemnor's amended petition
was set aside. The Highway Department, however, proceeded
to remove dirt from the new location. After the earth had been
removed, the landowners brought an action ex delicto seeking
damages for trespass and conversion. The court of appeal held
that the trial court erred in denying damages in the same
amount as would be determined by ex delicto or article 507
standards, and increased the award to a net $111,000. The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court reversed, holding that recovery would be
restricted to just compensation as in an ordinary action to
interest and attorney's fees while the other sections of the constitution
speak of amounts exclusive of such interest and fees, the drafters of the
constitution intended this to be a further limitation on this class of city
courts. The more likely explanation of this difference in terms, however,
is that expressed by McMahon in the introduction to LA. R.S. ANN.-CODE
Civ. P. bk. VIII, tit. 1 (West 1960): "The word 'inclusive' in the constitu-
tional provision is actually due to a typographical error in an earlier amend-
ment, retained by subsequent amendments . . . . [T]he Louisiana State
Law Institute intended to recommend the amendment of this constitutional
provision to correct the error; but through inadvertence such a recommen-
dation was not submitted to the Legislature in 1960."
25. 3 Orl. App. 220 (La. App. 1925). See material and following dis-
cussion referred to by note 8 supra.
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expropriate property. "[The] measure of compensation is to be
estimated by the same standards whether the property is for-
mally expropriated in accordance with law or appropriated by
the condemning authority so long as it is intentionally taken for
a public use."' Gray v. State, Through the Department of High-
ways, 250 La. 1045, 202 So.2d 24 (1967).
The instant case presented the issue of whether a landowner
may recover damages by ex delicto standards against the state
for appropriation of property. Similar attempts in the past have
usually failed because of the concept of sovereign immunity.
2
In an effort to circumvent this concept, property owners have
brought their actions under article I, section 2, of the Louisiana
Constitution, which prohibits the taking or damaging of private
property until after the payment of just compensation.3 The
article has been found self-executing; therefore suit requires no
legislative authorization. 4 These inverse condemnation proceed-
ings, however, have been limited to actions arising from an
intentional taking for a public purpose.5 Recovery of damages
for the negligent acts of a state employee engaged in a public
duty has not been allowed.0 Such act was held not to be a
"taking" within the meaning of the constitutional provision, and
therefore any recovery of damages required legislative approval.1
In the instant case, however, there was no need to confront
the concept of sovereign immunity since the immunity previ-
ously enjoyed by the Highway Department had been waived by
the legislature." The landowners therefore chose to institute the
action under article 2315 of the Civil Code rather than article
1. Gray v. State, Through the Department of Highways, 250 La. 1045,
1059, 202 So.2d 24, 29 (1967).
2. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948); Marie v. Police
Jury of the Parish of Terrebonne, 161 So.2d 407 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964);
Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
3. LA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
4. E.g., Scorsune v. State, 224 La. 1031, 71 So.2d 557 (1954); Angelle v.
State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948); Aleman v. Sewerage & Water Board
of New Orleans, 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940); Harrison v. Louisiana High-
way Commission, 191 La. 839, 186 So. 354 (1939); Booth v. Louisiana Highway
Commission, 171 La. 1096, 133 So. 169 (1931); Kendeal v. State Department of
Highways, 168 So.2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1964); Hebert v. T. L. James & Co.,
72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
5 Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. LA. R.S. 48:22 (1950); Hamilton v. City of Shreveport, 247 La. 784, 174




I, section 2, of the constitution. The amount recoverable in an
ex delicto action is the amount necessary to restore the injured
party to the same position he enjoyed prior to the wrongful act,
i.e., no less than the value of the dirt removed in the instant
case.9 The amount recoverable under an action for compensa-
tion under article I, section 2, of the constitution is the diminu-
tion in the market value of the property taken and any sever-
ance damages incurred.'0 In the instant case the value of the
dirt removed greatly exceeded the diminution in market value.
The court, therefore, had to decide whether a landowner whose
property is intentionally taken for a public purpose, without
lawful condemnation proceedings, by a state agency subject to
suit, may choose between an ex delicto or an inverse condemna-
tion action authorized by the constitution. The Supreme Court
indicated that such a landowner was limited to an inverse
condemnation proceeding. The court stated:
"[W]hen the owner recovers just compensation, he recovers
all the law gives him. To hold otherwise would be to inflict
punitive damages upon the condemnor which is not permis-
sible under our civil law system.""
In support of the holding, the court cited prior jurisprudence
that established the distinction between actions arising under the
constitution and those classified as ex delicto.12 Since the instant
case involved no question of sovereign immunity, the relevancy
of these decisions would appear to be somewhat tenuous. The
holding is subject to the further criticism that the ultimate effect
is the same that would have resulted had the Highway Depart-
ment proceeded lawfully. The conclusion suggested is that there
is no sanction to encourage compliance with the prescribed pro-
cedure for exercising the rather harsh process of involuntary
alienation. " The court was obviously influenced by the policy
of protecting the public fisc and the fact that the state, through
a technical error, was forced to pay for an unnecessary and
9. Aleman v. Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 196 La. 428, 199
So. 380 (1940); Hebert v. T. L. James & Co., 72 So.2d 754 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1954).
10. Id.
11. 250 La. 1045, 1061, 202 So.2d 24, 30 (1967).
12. Angelle v. State, 212 La. 1069, 34 So.2d 321 (1948); Schneidau v. Lou-
isiana Highway Commission, 206 La. 754, 20 So.2d 14 (1944); Aleman v.
Sewerage & Water Board of New Orleans, 196 La. 428, 199 So. 380 (1940).
13. See dissenting opinion in principal case, Gray v. State, Through the
Department of Highways, 191 So.2d 802 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966).
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unused servitude.1 4 The latter occurrence, however, should have
had no bearing on whether a trespass occurred. Despite the
rather broad holding, there were indications that the result
might be limited to the facts of the present case.15 Application
of unqualified language in the case would indicate that the exis-
tence of a constitutional remedy forecloses the use of a civil
remedy or modifies the damages recoverable by the latter.16
Considering the express waiver of sovereign immunity, it would
seem that there are few persuasive reasons why the state should
not be responsible for damages arising from an unlawful entry
to the same extent as an individual.
Robert W. Collings
FEDERAL LAW AND SEASHOaE ACCRETION
Plaintiff, owner of a tract of land on the Pacific Ocean in the
State of Washington, brought an action in state court to quiet
title to alluvion formed since 1889, the date of the state's admis-
sion to the Union. Title derived from a federal patent issued be-
fore statehood which conveyed title "to the line of ordinary high
tide."' Plaintiff claimed all alluvion formed after 1889. The trial
court held that federal rather than state law governed since title
derived from a federal patent issued before statehood and that
under common law plaintiff had a right to the alluvion. Under
state law she would not have acquired title to the alluvion be-
cause the State Constitution2 provided that all lands accreted
14. 250 La. 1045, 1063, 202 So.2d 24, 30 (1967): "In truth, the supplemental
order of expropriation was invalid solely because of a legal error of a tech-
nical nature and, as a result of it, plaintiffs obtained a windfall of $37,145, or
as (sic) least $36,000, for the unused borrow pit."
15. By way of dicta the court offered two other possible bases for the
holding in the case. They indicated that under the facts given there had
been no tortious act committed and, in any event, the plaintiff was estopped
by his failure to get an injunction to prevent the unlawful action by the
state. It is interesting to speculate whether the cost of an injunction pro-
ceeding to the state, in possibly closing down an interstate highway con-
struction project, would have exceeded the damages sought for the alleged
trespass.
16. 250 La. 1045, 1059, 202 So.2d 24, 29 (1967): "The measure of compen-
sation is to be estimated by the same standards whether the property is
formally expropriated in accordance with law or appropriated by the con-
demning authority so long as it is intentionally taken for a public use."
1. Hughes v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 799, n.801, 410 P.2d 20 (1966).
2. WASH. CONST. art. 17, § 1: Declaration of State Ownership. "The state
of Washington asserts its ownership to the beds and shores of all navigable
waters in the state up to and including the line of ordinary high tide, in
waters where the tide ebbs and flows, and up to and including the line of
ordinary high water within the banks of all navigable rivers and lakes."
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